On the value of modesty: How signals of status undermine cooperation

https://psycnet.apa.org/doiLanding?doi=10.1037%2Fpspa0000303

The widespread demand for luxury is best understood by the social advantages of signaling status (i.e., conspicuous consumption; Veblen, 1899). In the present research, we examine the limits of this perspective by studying the implications of status signaling for cooperation.

Cooperation is principally about caring for others, which is fundamentally at odds with the self-promotional nature of signaling status.

Across behaviorally consequential Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games and naturalistic scenario studies, we investigate both sides of the relationship between signaling and cooperation: (a) how people respond to others who signal status, as well as (b) the strategic choices people make about whether to signal status.

In each case, we find that people recognize the relative advantage of modesty (i.e., the inverse of signaling status) and behave strategically to enable cooperation. That is, people are less likely to cooperate with partners who signal status compared to those who are modest (Studies 1 and 2), and more likely to select a modest person when cooperation is desirable (Study 3).

These behaviors are consistent with inferences that status signalers are less prosocial and less prone to cooperate. Importantly, people also refrain from signaling status themselves when it is strategically beneficial to appear cooperative (Studies 4–6).

Together, our findings contribute to a better understanding of the conditions under which the reputational costs of conspicuous consumption outweigh its benefits, helping integrate theoretical perspectives on strategic interpersonal dynamics, cooperation, and status signaling.

https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2022/04/220421094043.htm

In one experiment, 395 online participants were told to evaluate social media profiles to find cooperative, selfless and generous people to join their community. Participants were then randomly assigned to view either a modest social media profile with neutral posts (e.g., “I saw the cutest puppy today! #goldenretrievers”) or a profile that aimed to signal high social status. The status signaling profile contained the same neutral language as the first, but it also included posts about luxury cars, clothing, food or travel (e.g., “Heading to Madrid! #firstclass #luxury”).

In another experiment, 1,345 participants from behavioral labs at three U.S. universities were asked to imagine they were creating their own social media profile and that they needed to choose what to wear for their profile picture. The participants were told that they were trying to be selected for an online group, but only half of the participants were told that the group they were hoping to join was looking for someone extremely cooperative. They were then given the choice of appearing in luxury brand clothing such as Prada or Gucci, non-luxury brand clothing such as Sketchers or Old Navy, or unbranded clothing.

Participants who were trying to appear like a cooperative team player were much less likely to choose to wear luxury clothes in their profile picture than the ones who were not. But people were equally likely to choose to wear a non-luxury brand whether cooperation was emphasized or not, the researchers found.

Modesty may be key when cooperation is essential, according to Srna, but the researchers also found that in some cases status signaling has advantages. While participants were less likely to choose someone who signals their wealth or status to join a group seeking cooperative members, they were more likely to choose that person when they were told the group was looking for a competitive team member.